The Villain Has a Point by Cuzzolino, Amy
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2016
The Villain Has a Point
Amy Cuzzolino
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cuzzolino, Amy, "The Villain Has a Point" (2016). Law School Student Scholarship. 674.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/674
The Villain Has a Point
The most vocal African critics of the International Criminal Court are the same people the Court
is trying for heinous crimes. Should we listen to them anyway?
y
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Introduction
In the twelve years since the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") came into
force, it has received complaints from persecuted peoples andconcerned parties across the globe.
The eight "situations" upon which the Court has opened investigations, however, have only
come from the African continent.1 Some have complained that this focus on Africa belies a
Western bias in the Court, that the ICC is selective in administeringjustice and is prolongingthe
injustice of European colonialism through Western cultural imperialism. The mostvocal of these
critics are hardly unbiased: they are the very people the ICC is trying for horrific human rights
abuses including war crimes, crimesagainst humanity, and genocide. The detractors include state
officials, in two cases heads of state2, who believe their status makes them immune from
prosecution for any alleged wrongdoing. Perversely, these rulers owetheirpower to the legacy of
colonialism, and are the beneficiaries of the system they claim to stand against. They stand for
the very kind of impunity the Court was designed to eradicate.
It is easy therefore to look at these messengers and discount the message. Indeed, there
are many good arguments that justify the ICC's continued intervention in African cases. The
issues at hand, however, are more complicated than simply whether the Court's involvement in
Africa is good or bad or whether it should continue or stop. While it may spring from impure
motives, the villain has a point.4 The Court's involvement in Africa is a problem for a continent
that has been immeasurably damaged by its colonial history. To pull itself out from under that
1Aninth matter, TheSituation on Registered Vessels of the Union of theComoros, theHellenic Republic, and the
Kingdom of Cambodia,Case No. ICC-01/13, dealingwithallegedattacks on humanitarianaid flotillas, was
assigned to a Pre-Trial Chamber on July 13,2013. However, this has been called a "procedural matter only, and is
not the beginning of an investigation." It was referred to the Courtby the Unionof Comoros, an African island
nation.
2Omar Al Bashirof Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya.
3RomeStatuteof the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998,2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("Rome Statute"), Preamble.
4The title of this paper is borrowed from TV Tropes (http://tvtropes.org), a database of commonly recognized
storytelling devices.
history, there must be infrastructure to develop the rule of law and provide safety and security for
African people. Is the ICC's presence in Africa helping or hindering the formation of such
infrastructure? More than half the situations before the Court were initiated by affected states.
What were these countries looking for the ICC to provide, and has the Court given it to them?
The focus on Africa has also created problems for the ICC itself that go to the heart of its
functionality and purpose. The Court is dependent on the support of its member states for
enforcement. Is the ICC-and can it afford to be-alienating the 34 African countries that are
parties to the Rome Statute, and the ten more who have signed but not ratified it? Is the Court
fulfilling its mission to end impunity? The Court may need to look beyond Africa not only to
benefit the continent but to meet its own goals and continue to function in the future.
The Establishment of the International Criminal Court
International tribunals have been set up to try horrendous crimes for hundreds of years.
The creation of a permanent international criminal court is a newer idea, in the works since the
early 20th century.7 Following the First World War, the Preliminary Peace Conference of 1919
proposed a tribunal that would try violators of "the customs of war and the laws of humanity."
What it developed instead was a provision in the Treaty of Versailles for a special tribunal to try
5The situations in Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, andMali were initiated after
referral to the Prosecutor by the stateparties. Thesituation inCote d'lvoire was initiated by the Prosecutor under
Article 15 after PresidentAlassaneOuattaragranted the Courtjurisdictionand promisedfull cooperation witha
potential investigation. K.
6The probable first international tribunal was set up to tr/Peter von Hagenbach for atrocities committed during the
occupation of Breisach in 1474. See, e.g., William A. Scabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Cam. Univ. Press, 4th Ed., 2011).
7Gustav Monnier, oneof the founders of the International Committee of the RedCrossadvocated for an
international criminal court in the 1860s, but no legislation was ever considered.
8Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
665,669(1996).
only Kaiser Wilhelm II for crimes against "international morality."9 This tribunal never came
into being and further efforts to create a permanent international tribunal stalled until the end of
World War II.10 Then, having experienced the full horror of the Nazi regime, the Allied Powers
established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.11 An International Military
Tribunal for the Far East was set up in Tokyo using similar provisions. The IMT Charter
established principles that would inform later tribunals and the eventual ICC. It tried and
convicted the accused on charges of war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity.13 It also upheld the idea that individuals, not states, should be held responsible for
these crimes.14 Significantly, being the head of a state did not grant an individual protection
against prosecution, though the idea was not put to the test at this time.15 Finally, the tribunal
created precedents of international criminal law, something that had been arguably lacking for
the Nuremberg court itself.16
Following the success of the WWII tribunals, the United Nations established the
International Law Commission (ILC) to codify developing international law. The same year, the
9Treaty of Peace with Germany, Jun. 28,1919,2 Bevans 43("Treaty of Versailles"), art. 227.
10 Leila Sadat Wexler, supra note 8 at 670.
11 The Agreement fortheProsecution and Punishment ofMajor War Criminals of theEuropean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 U.N.T.S. 279 ("IMT Charter").
12 William A. Scabas, supra note 6 at 7.
13 IMT Charter, Art. 6. Thecrime of genocide became part of the international criminal lexicon in 1948. Crimes
against peace were the forerunners to crimes of aggression.
14 IMTCharter, Art 8. International law at the time was mostlythoughtto govern the laws and rightsbetween states,
not individuals. One of the early and persisting arguments againstthe establishment of an international criminal
court is that it threatens the sovereignty of states.
15 Noheads of stateweretried in Nuremberg or Tokyo. TheNazi leader, for obvious reasons, wasno longer
available, and Emperor Hirohito was famously not charged with war crimes for political reasons.
16 Leila Sadat Wexler, supra note8 at 726. The most solid legal foundation for the trials at Nuremberg were treaties
thatGermany had signedat arguably violated. The tribunal did not pointto specific laws individuals hadviolated
aside from general international principles.
Genocide Convention was adopted by the General Assembly.17 Article VI ofthe Convention was
written in anticipation of an international criminal court, allowing that genocide would be tried
by a competent state tribunal or "such international penal tribunal as may havejurisdiction." The
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General Assembly asked the ILC to studythe possibility of establishing such a court. The ILC
was also asked to draft a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which it
first did in 1954.19 Meanwhile, a separate committee drafted a statute for an international
criminal court.20 Work on the court was halted for decades, however, by the escalation of the
Cold War.21 As the Cold War was winding down in 1989, a coalition of states led by Trinidad
and Tobago proposed a permanent court to deal with drug trafficking and other transnational
crimes.22 The ILC went to work on a Draft Statute of the court, which it completed in 1994.23
Two years later, itprepared a final version ofits Code ofCrimes.24
As the ILC was making plans for a permanent court, events of the early 1990s brought
about the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals to deal with situations in which gross violations of
international law had occurred. The first was the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993.25 The ICTY was to investigate "grave breaches" ofthe
Geneva Conventions and other instruments of international humanitarian law, particularly those
17 UN General Assembly, Convention onthe Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention"), A/RES/260, Dec. 9, 1948.
18 Study bytheInt'l Law Comm. of theQuestion ofanInt'l Crim. Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 260B(III), U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm.,3d Sess., 179thplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810(1948), at 177.The study ultimately found that a permanent
court was both achievable and desired by a number of states.
19 Summary Records of the280th Meeting, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9),U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
20 Report ofthe Comm. onInt'l Crim. Ct. Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/2135 (1952).
21 William A.fecabas^upra note 6at 9.
22 Id. at 10. v^/
23 Report oftheInt'l Law Comm., U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
24 Report oftheInt'l Law Comm. onthe work of its forty-eighth session, GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996).
25 S.C. Res. 827,U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
committed during the conflict in Bosnia. The temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal was to start on
January 1, 1991 and extend indefinitely into the future.26 The following year, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established to address the genocide that country had
recently endured.27 Its jurisdiction covered crimes committed between January 1 and December
31, 1994. The statutes for both the ICTY and the ICTR relied heavily on the draft Statute and
Codeof Crimes that had been developed by the ICL. The two tribunals were also nearly identical
in their governing statutes and their institutional practices.28 Some notable achievements of the
tribunals are the recognition that crimes against humanity may occur during times of peace and
the narrowing of focus to superior officers to prevent arbitrary prosecution. The tribunals also
provideda preview for how the eventual permanentcourt might operate.
r
/ In June and July of 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
I
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court met in Rome. The aim of the conference
iwas to develop the final statute that would govern the International Criminal Court. Presentwere
i
representatives from 159 states, the Holy See, Palestine, governmental organizations including
the European Community and the International Red Cross, and over 100 non-governmental
organizations from around the world.29 Details ofthe Statute were settled by "working groups,"
while major issues were discussed by the executive Bureau overseeing the conference and
decided upon by Committee chair Philippe Kirsch. These key issues included the extent of the
Court's jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction over non-state parties, the "trigger mechanism"
that would bring cases before the Court, and the role ofthe Security Council.30 The draft Statute
<f\
26 A/, at 1f 2.
27 S.C. Res. 955, U.N.Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
28 William A\ Scabas, supra note 6 at 13.
29 Official RecordsrVol. I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (2002).
30 William A. Scabas, supra note6 at 20.
needed a two-thirds majority to be approved, and these particular issues were contentious for
many of the states present. A vote was taken on July 17, with 120 states voting in favor, 21
abstaining, and 7 voting against. 25 countries signed the treaty immediately. Among the states
that abstained were countries from the Middle East and the Caribbean. The votes against came
from Israel, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Yemen, China, and the United States.
The ICC is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the trial chambers, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry.31 The Registry, headed by a Registrar, handles the non-judicial
administration of the Court.32 The Presidency consists of a President and two Vice Presidents
elected by the judges of the Court.33 The current President is Song Sang-Hyun of South Korea
and the first and second Vice Presidents are Sanji Mmasenono Monageng of Botswana and Cuno
Tarfusser of Italy, respectively. The Court has three chambers: the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial
Division, and the Appeals Chamber.34 The judiciary of the Court is currently composed of 21
full-time and ad litem judges. Six of the judges are nationals of Western Europe, three are from
Eastern Europe, three are from Asia, four are from Latin America and the Caribbean, and five
are nationals of African states.35 The Office of the Prosecutor consists of the Chief Prosecutor,
the Deputy Prosecutor, and Heads of Jurisdiction and Investigation.36 The first Chief Prosecutor,
in office from June 2003 to June 2012, was Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina. The second and
current Chief Prosecutor is the former Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensoudaof the Gambia.
31 Rome Statute, Art. 34.
32 Rome Statute, Art.43.
33 Rome Statute, Art. 38.
34 Rome Statute, Art. 39.
35 ICC, Structure of the Court- Chambers, available atwww.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure°/o20ofD/o20the%20court/chambers/Pages/chambers.aspx.
36 ICC, Structure of the Court - Office of the Prosecutor, available at www.icc-
cpi.mt/en_menus/icc/stmcture%20ofyo20the%20court/offi
e%20prosecutor.aspx.
Under the new Rome Statute, the Court was to come into force after 60 states had
become parties through ratification or accession.37 This happened on April 11, 2002 with the
ratification of the treaty by ten new states.38 The International Criminal Court officially became
operational for 65 state parties on July 1, 2002. For states that have ratified since then, the entry
into force of the Court is the first of the month 60 days after the instrument of ratification is
deposited with the Registrar.39 The Court presently has 122 state parties, with an additional 31
signatories that have yet to ratify.40 The Court's temporal jurisdiction allows it only to
investigate and try crimes that have taken place after its entry in force, unless a non-state party
has made a prior declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction.41 In this way, the Court can avoid
a criticism that has bedeviled criminal tribunals since the beginning: that they dole out ex post
facto justice. The downside is that the Court has no power to address a host of crimes that fall
outside this absolute jurisdiction. This is a gap that ad hoc tribunals may continue to fill. Since
the adoption of theRome Statute, special tribunals have been formed in Sierra Leone, Cambodia,
and Lebanon with the helpof the United Nations. A tribunal was considered for the Darfur crisis
in Sudan until the Security Council opted to refer the situation to the ICC.
The Court currently has jurisdiction over three crimes: genocide, described by Article 6,
crimes against humanity, described by Article 7, and war crimes, outlined in Article 8. A fourth
37 Rome Statute, Art. 126(1).
38 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, Jordan, Mongolia,
Niger, Romania, andSlovakia. Theinstruments ofratification were deposited ina ceremony inwhich allten
countries submitted to the Registrar simultaneously soeach had thehonor of becoming the60thstate to ratify.
39 Rome Statute, Art. 126(2).
40 Some signatories, including theUnited States, Israel, and Sudan, have made announcements signaling thatthey no
longer intend to ratify theRome Statute. Palestine, Cote d'lvoire, and Ukraine have made acceptances ofjurisdiction
under Art. 12(3).
41 Rome Statute, Art. 11.
42 U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (2005). A tribunal wasparticularly advocated for by the United States, which hassought to
undermine the Court since its inception.
crime, aggression, is mentioned in the Rome Statute but will not come within the Court's
jurisdiction until at least 2017.43 The Court has adopted many features of predecessor tribunals,
including the exercise of jurisdiction over persons rather than states, focus on superior officers,
and the denial of immunity for heads of state. For the Court to be able to exercise jurisdiction,
the crimes in question must be committed either on a state party's territory or by a national of a
state party.44 Investigations may be "triggered" in three ways.45 First, a state party may refer a
situation to the Prosecutor. Second, the Prosecutor may opt to initiate an investigation proprio
motu. Unlike a referral by a state party, a proprio motu investigation is subject to authorization
through a Pre-Trial Chamber.46 Additionally, any investigation may be deferred for up to a year
upon a request from the Security Council.47 Finally, an investigation may be initiated upon a
referral from the Security Council itself. A very important distinction of a Security Council
referral is that it may involve crimes that are otherwise not within the Court's jurisdiction under
Article 12. Hence, even states who are not parties to the Rome Statute may become subject to the
Court's jurisdiction at the behest of the Security Council.
The Rome Statute was ultimately a compromise and the ICC still struggles to find
balance in certain areas. The jurisdiction of the Court was intended to be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.48 This means that an investigation into a situation by a state that
has jurisdiction will render that situation inadmissible before the Court unless the state is
43 Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8
(2010). As per the amendments, the Court will havejurisdiction overcrimesof aggression startingone year afterthe
amendmenthas been ratified by 30 states, but in any case not before Jan. 1,2017. Currently 13 states have ratified
the amendments.
44 Rome Statute, Art. 12(2).
45 Rome Statute, Art. 13.
46 Rome Statute, Art. 15(3).
47 Rome Statute, Art. 16.
48 Rome Statute, Preamble; Art. 1.
"unwilling or unable" to carry out the investigation "genuinely."49 The function of the ICC as a
"court of last resort" was specifically designed to encourage states to prosecute grave crimes on
their territories and also tomaintain a respect for state sovereignty.50 This addressed the concerns
of states that were worried that an overzealous Prosecutor would wield too much international
power.51 Deference to state sovereignty is also found inthe Court's enforcement mechanisms, or
lack thereof. The Court has no independent means of arresting suspects or obtaining evidence
and must rely on states to carry out these actions. For their own part, state parties are obligated to
cooperate with the Court's investigations: complying with requests to produce documents,
delivering suspects for arrest, and protecting victims and witnesses.52 This ultimately creates an
imbalance between wealthy member states and poorer ones. Problems of enforcement arise
because often states that lack the infrastructure or perhaps the will necessary to investigate and
prosecute crimes are also not in a position to carry out the enforcement that an ICC investigation
requires. Ultimately, the Court may seek the help ofpowerful countries or international forces to
act as "surrogate enforcers."53 This, inturn, diminishes the target state's exercise of sovereignty.
Additionally, the Court is funded bycontributions from member states ona scaled basis. It also
receives voluntary contributions from states and other entities.55 Between states that finance the
Court and states that require its interventionthere is little overlap.
49 Rome Statute, Art. 17(l)(a).
50 Roy S.Lee, An Assessment ofthe ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 751 (2002).
51 Id. at 757.
52 Rome Statute,Art. 86; 87; 89; 93.
53 Victor Peskin, Caution andConfrontation inthe International Criminal Court's Pursuit ofAccountability in
Uganda andSudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 691 (2009).
54 Rome Statutes, Art. 117.
55 Rome Statute,Art. 116.
The Legacy of Colonialism in Africa
The intrusion of Europe into Africa stretches centuries back, starting with the
colonization of North Africa by the Greeks in antiquity. Much later, with the discovery of the
New World, came the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The slave trade displaced or killed over 200
million people, primarily from West Africa.56 In modern terms, the slave trade isrecognized as a
crime against humanity.57 Following the slave trade came the exploitation of the natural
resources of the continent itself in the European "Scramble for Africa" beginning in the mid-
1800s. A handful of European powers divided the continent amongst themselves, drawing
boundary lines that were irrespective of existing polities and kingdoms. Prior to colonization, a
range of societies existed across the continent, from hunter-gatherer groups to sophisticated
political states. Eachhad their own long-established systems of law, culture, andtradition. These
societies were all leveled and homogenized under colonial rule.58 "Tribal" distinctions had not
been traditionally important characteristics in most African societies, but the Europeans created
and enforced ethnic division in order to organize and manage the local people in a manner most
efficient for colonization.59 Colonization was devastating for Africa, but immensely profitable
for Europe: at the cost of millions of lives, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, France,
56 Tseliso Thipanyane, Current Claims, Regional Experiences, Pressing Problems: Identification ofthe Salient
Issues andPressing Problems inanAfrican Post-Colonial Perspective, 2001 HUM. RTS. DEV. Y.B. 33,36 (2001).
Using figures from a 1978 UNESCO conference report.
57 Declaration of the Third WorldConference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related
Intolerance ("Durban Declaration"), U13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2001).
58 William Pfaff, ANew Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back Into Africa, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 2,4 (1995).
59 Tseliso Thipanyane, supra note 56at 39. The ethnic struggle between Hutu and Tutsi groups inRwanda is largely
due to an enforced societal hierarchy by German and later Belgiancolonizers. "Tutsis" were those who were
wealthy and moreEuropean-looking features. Europeans evencreated an originstory for the Tutsithat included
early ethnic mixing with Europeans.
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and others made hundreds of millions of dollars.60 Today, this deliberate and systematic
destruction oflife has been recognized as genocide.61
The colonizing powers neglected to put in place any social or political infrastructure
beyond what was needed to appropriate natural resources and export them to Europe.
Colonialism can be blamed for Africa's failure to take part in the Industrial Revolution and the
advances that followed because it decimatedmanpower and skilled labor and placed the focus of
development on Europe's needs instead ofAfrica's.63 Into this gap came European civil society
and missionaries, "the nineteenth-century equivalent of NGOs and human rights groups."
While these groups generally condemned colonial abuse and exploitation, their primary purpose
was to "civilize" African people through the introduction of Western religion and customs. The
commonality between the missionaries and the colonial officials is that both sawAfrican people
as inferior and dependent upon European intervention.65 A persisting social and economic
inequality has stemmed from this way ofthinking.66 By one estimate, conducted by the African
World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, the total damage done to the African
continentby slavery and European colonialism is $777 trillion.
60 Id. at 37. Onescholar, JulesMarchal, estimates thatKing Leopold II of Belgium personally made a profit of $1.1
billion, adjusted for inflation, from the Belgian Congo.
61 Id. at 38.
62 William Pfaff, supra note 58 at 4.
63 Tseliso Thipanyane, supra note 56 at 39,quoting Oguejiofor Okafor and Sheriffdeen Telia, Economic
Development andthe Prospectfor Economic Security inAfrica, AFRICA AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE CHANGING
Perspectives ON Security, 24 (AdebayoOyebadeand Abiodun Alao eds., World Press Inc., 1998).
64 Frederick Cooper, Networks, moral discourse, and history, INTERVENTION AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN AFRICA,
Global-Local Networks of Power, 33 (Thomas Callaghy,Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham, eds., Cam.
Univ. Press, 2001).
65 William Pfaff, supra note 58at4.
66 Durban Declaration, ^ 14.
67 BBC, Trillions Demanded inSlavery Reparation, Aug. 20, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/424984.stm.
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The end of the colonial era started in the late 1940s and continued until all African states
were independent of European rule in 1980.68 Decolonization was hastened by the rise of Pan-
Africanism, a movement that started in the African diaspora that envisioned a single, continent-
wide community.69 Kwame Nkrumah, the first president ofGhana and a founding member of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) famously said that Africa must find "an African solution
to our problems."70 The OAU, founded in 1963, had as its goals the betterment of life for all
African people, defense of the sovereignty of African states, the protection of human rights, and
particularly the eradication of colonialism.71 Unfortunately, both the organization and the
movement for African unity became coopted by dictators who took advantage of the power
vacuum left by the retreating European powers. Using the tenets of the OAU, they were able to
frame repressive and abusive policies as exercises in rejecting Western influence and building
African nationalism.72
Throughout the 1980s, the primary focus of the OAU was ending apartheid in South
Africa. The OAU had done little work on settling disputes between countries or making a
positive impact on the economic climate. Once the end of apartheid was accomplished in 1994,
the unifying purpose ofthe organization dissolved.73 The failure ofthe OAU may be due in part
to its reliance on the idea that the shared trauma of colonialism would inspire cooperation in the
continent. Those that wished to reform the OAU chose a model for Africa progress that looked
68 OnApril 18,1980, Zimbabwe gained independence from theUnited Kingdom. African states thathave formed
since then (Eritrea, South Sudan) gained independencefrom another African state.
69 See, e.g, Bjem Meller, Pan-Africanism andfederalism, PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, Vol. 2, No. 3 at 58
(2010). Manyearly Pan-Africanists, such as Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. DuBois, were American.
70 Kwame Nkrumah, I SPEAK OF FREEDOM (1961). The quote is oftenrestyledas "African solutionsfor African
problems."
71 OAU Charter, Art. 2(1) May25, 1963.
72 Bj0m M0ller, supra note 69 at 57. Kwame Nkrumah himself was criticized forhaving dictatorial aspirations.
73 Corinne A.A. Packerand Donald Rukare, The New African Union anditsConstitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 365,
366 (2002).
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forward instead of backward. In 1991, while the ILC was drafting a statute for an international
criminal court, 34 African leaders met in Abuja, Nigeria to sign the Treaty Establishing the
African Economic Community.74 Its primary goal and purpose was to create a globally
competitive, self-sustaining continent.75 Contained within the treaty were detailed plans for the
creation of an African Union.76 Ten years after the Abuja Treaty, the Constitutive Act of the
African Union came into force.77 One week afterjthe^entry into force of the ICC, the African
Union (AU) officially came into being on July 9, 2002. 54)African states are members of the
Union.78 The drafting and implementation of the AU were incredibly fast, yet the birth of the
organization drew little press or scholarly attention compared to, for example, the European
Union.79
The AU is composed of nine organs laid out by the Constitutive Act. The General
Assembly, made up of the heads of member state governments, meets once a year and has
supreme authority in the Union.80 Many of the Union's other institutions have yet to come into
being. There are provisions for financial institutions, including an African Central Bank, an
African Monetary Fund, and an African Investment Bank.81 There are also extensive plans in
place for an African judiciary. The founding documents call for an African Court of Justice.
74 Treaty Establishing theAfrican Economic Community ("Abuja Treaty"), Jun. 3, 1991.
75 Corrine A.A. Packer and Donald Rukare, supra note 73at 370. Seealso, Study onanAfrican Union Government
towards the UnitedStates ofAfrica, Commission Report (Jul. 2006) at 6.
76 Abuja Treaty, Chapt. III.
77 Organisation ofAfrican Unity, The Constitutive Act ofthe African Union Attains the Legal Requirementfor
Entering into Force, Press Release 52/2001, Apr. 27,2001.
78 The only African state that is nota member isMorocco, having lefttheOAU in 1984 after the admittance of the
Sahrawi Republic in Western Sahara. Three member states, theCentral African Republic, Egypt, and Guinea-Bissau
are currently suspended due to their internal conflicts.
79 Corrine A.A. Packer andDonald Rukare, supra note 73 at 365.
80 Constitutive Act of the AfricanUnion("Constitutive Act"), Art.6, Jul. 11,2000.
81 Constitutive Act, Art. 18, 19; Abuja Treaty, Art. 6(2)(f). The Abuja Treaty callsfor the financial institutions to be
in place by 2028.
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However, these plans were superseded by the creation of the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights.82 The Court came into being on January 25, 2004 after the 15th state ratified the
protocol. Currently, 26 states are parties tothis court.83 The Court of Human and Peoples' Rights
hasjurisdictionover civil disputes broughtby individuals against their governments based on the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other human rights instruments to which its
member states are parties.84 The Court has taken on 27 cases since 2008.85 In July 2008, a
protocol was signedto create a merger of this court and the proposed Courtof Justice. The new
courtwill enter into force when the protocol receives 15 ratifications. Currently, only five states
have ratified.87 In 2012, the AU adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and
Governance.88 The provisions of the Charter state that "unconstitutional changes ingovernment,"
encompassing dictatorial takeovers, may be tried before acompetent court of theUnion.
The proposed expansion of the African Court has caused concern in the international
community, particularly regarding the new court's jurisdictional overlap with that of the ICC.
There is a worry thatentities that oppose the ICC, including those guilty of human rights abuses,
82 Protocol to the AfricanCharter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an AfricanCourton
Human and Peoples' Rights, Jun. 9, 1998.
83 The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, www.au.int/en/organs/cj. AllAfrican states areparties to the
original BanjulCharterexcept for Moroccoand South Sudan.
84 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 (1982).
85 African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, Cases Status, www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2012-03-04-06-
06-00/cases-status1.
86 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justiceand Human Rights, Jul. 1, 2008.
87 Benin, Burkina Faso,Congo,Libya, and Mali.
www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20Stamte%20ofyo20me%20African%20Court%20ofyo20Justice
%20and%20HR_0.pdf.
88 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, Jan. 30,2007.TheCharter came into force after 15
states ratified it.
89 See, e.g., Observations and Recommendations on the International Criminal Court and the African Union, Hum.
Rts. Watch, Jun. 27,2011, www.hrw.org/node/99945.
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may try to use the conflicting jurisdiction to weaken the ICC.90 Additionally, the proposed
merger would bring the African judiciary into the realm of criminal prosecution of individuals,
which will require specialized expertise and a huge outlay ofresources.91 The problems caused
by a lack of infrastructure and economic stabilitystill persist as they did in the days of the OAU,
meaning that the African Court system will be subject to the same abusesand ineffectiveness.
As the African continent has been attempting to create structure internally, it also has
been attempting to enter onto the world stage. The genocide in Rwanda was a starkreminder not
only of how grave African problems were but also of how little the outside world was paying
attention. The ICTR had only come about as the result of a letter from the Government of
Rwanda to the Security Council.92 In it, Rwanda called out the international community for
ignoring the genocide and contributing to the crisis through inaction and ignorant
misinformation. The tribunal was authorized within two months. The genocide was also a major
factor influencing the widespread embrace of the ICC by African countries.93 34 African states
are parties to the Rome Statute and ten more are signatories.94 The appeal for these countries was
the possibility that the Court could give them justice for the abuses they'd endured and
discourage similar abuse in the future. This was predicated on the notion that African states
would be treated the same as all other states.
Cases Before the International Criminal Court
90 See, e.g., AUHostility Threatens International Justice, Kenyan Section Int'l Commission ofJurists, May 31, 2011,
http://icj-kenya.org/index.php/media-centre/commentary/362-au-hostility-threatens-international-justice.
91 Id.
92 Letter dated 28 Sep. 1994, U.N. Doc.S/1994/1115 (1994).
93 JohnMukum Mbako, InternationalJustice: The International Criminal Court andAfrica, Foresight Africa 2014,
Brookings, (2014) at 9.
94 AnAfrican country, Senegal, wasthe first country to ratify theRome Statute.
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The Self-Referrals
The first lineof defense against assertions that the ICC is purposefully targeting Africa is
the fact thatmost of the situations before the Court are "self-referred".95 Under the Rome Statute,
a state party may make a request for the Prosecutor to begin an investigation ofcrimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.96 In early 2004, two such referrals, from Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, led to the opening in those countries of the ICC's first criminal
investigations. These self-referrals have usually been characterized as the states inviting the ICC
to become involved in their crises. This is something of an oversimplification.
By September 2003, the Court had received no referrals from either state parties or the
Security Council. It had, however, received nearly 500 communications regarding crimes from
around the world potentially within the Court's competence.97 Six of these communications
concerned the situation in the Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The current
Congolese conflict started in 1996 following the genocide and civil war inneighboring Rwanda.
Mobutu Sese Seko, the long-time president of what was then Zaire, had historically supported
the Hutu ethnic group and was seen as a threat by Rwanda's new Tutsi leadership. As Hutu
refugees spilled across from the Rwandan border, militant groups from Rwanda and Uganda
began attacking villages in Congo.100 Some ofthese forces eventually allied with domestic rebels
led by Laurent-Desire Kabila. In May of 1997, Kabila deposed Mobutu and declared himself
95 Fora discussion of"self-referral," which is nota separate legal concept under the Rome Statute, seeAndreas Th.
Muller and Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1269 (2010).
96 Rome Statute, Art. 15.
97 Report oftheProsecutor to the ICC, Sept. 8,2003,available at
http://legal.un.org/icc/asp/2ndsession/ocampo_statement_8sep(e).pdf.
98 UNPressConference, Jul. 16,2003, available at
www.iccnow.org/documents/160703press_conf_presentation.pdf.
99 William G. Thorn, Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context ofEvolving Patterns ofMilitary Conflict in
Africa inthe Era ofIndependence, 19J. OF CONFLICT STUD. 89,91 (1999).
100 Id. at 102.
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president of the Democratic Republic of Congo.101 Following the coup, Kabila's forces
conflicted with factions backed by Rwanda and Uganda who also sought to seize control of the
country. Hostilities between the three groups continued for years. Laurent-Desire Kabila was
1 (Y)
assassinated in January 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila Kabange, took over his reign. The
youngerKabila attempted to stop the hostilities and begin a peace process. In August 2002, little
over a month after the International Criminal Court became operational, DRC and Rwanda
signed a peace accord.103 A similar peace treaty with Uganda followed in September. These
agreements outlined plans for the removal of foreign troops from DRC and the institution of
conflict resolution mechanisms.
Despite these efforts, violence in DRC continued. By the time the situation came to the
attention of the Court, upwards of four million people had been killed in the conflict.
Estimates suggested that around five thousand of the deaths had occurred within the Court's
temporal jurisdiction.106 In addition to murders, including mass killings and summary executions,
there were numerous reported instances of rape, torture, mutilation, kidnapping, looting, and the
use of child soldiers.107 Based on the reports received, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo determined
that the situation in DRC would be the first "to be closely followed by the Office."108 After
101 Id. at 110.
102 Kyra Hild and Shannon Frank, The Current Investigation by the ICC ofthe Situation in the Democratic Republic
ofCongo, TheAmerican Non-Governmental Organizations Commission for the International Criminal Court
(AMICC), Apr. 24,2006, available atwww.amicc.org/docs/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo.pdf.
103 Peace Agreement between the Governments ofDRC and Rwanda, S/2002/914, Aug. 9, 2002, available at
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD%20RW_020730_PeaceAgreementRwandaDRC.pdf.
104 Agreement between the Governments of DRC and Uganda, Sep. 6, 2002, available at
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD%20UG_020906_Luanda%20Agreement.pdf.
105 Kira Hild and Shannon Frank, supra note 102 at4.
106 Report oftheProsecutor to the ICC, supra note 97at2.
107 Id. at 3.
108 Mat 2.
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acknowledging that an internal peace process was underway, Moreno-Ocampo declared his
willingness to initiate the Court's first investigation in DRC using his proprio motu powers.109
Of course, the DRC situation was not initiated this way. In the same report, the
Prosecutor publically entreated the government of DRC to refer itself to the Court.110 He
proposed a"division of labour" in whichthe Court would prosecute the most egregious offenders
and let national authorities develop the means to deal with others. The most obvious benefit to
waiting for a state referral was that it offered some assurance that DRC had the political will to
cooperate with investigations.111 Another reason to court state referrals was that it would be a
less threatening start for the ICC. At the Rome Conference, a number of powerful states had
opposed giving the Prosecutor the power to initiate investigations in the first place. By beginning
its investigations with self-referrals, the Court could cast itself as a cooperative assistant to
national judicial processes rather than anexternal force throwing its power around.
In December 2003, the ICC received its first state referral, not from the DRC but from
neighboring Uganda. Uganda has been in conflict since the exile of Idi Amin in the early 1980s.
After a succession of military leaders, Yoweri Museveni, the current president, came into power
in 1986. As the leader of the National Resistance Army (NRA), Museveni had participated in
numerous human rights violations while fighting against other militant groups. With
Museveni's victory, many combatants fled into neighboring DRC, the Central African Republic
109 Mat 4.
1,0 Id.
1!l Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of "Self-Referrals"aSound Startfor the ICC?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 949,950
(2004).
112 Id. at 951.
113 Amnesty International, Uganda: Breaking the Circle: Protecting Human Rights inthe Northern War Zone, AFR
59/001/1999, Mar. 17, 1999, available at www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/001/1999/en/l 7984178-e33c-
1Idd-808b-bfd8d459a3de/afr590011999en.pdf.
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(CAR), and what is now South Sudan.114 One group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by
Joseph Kony and backed by the support of the Sudanese government, emerged as the primary
anti-government antagonists.115 Since the early 1990s, the LRA has committed numerous
atrocities including mass executions and raids on civilians. The group is most notorious for its
forced recruitment of child soldiers.116 In March 2002, four months before the ICC came into
force, the Ugandan government struck back at the LRA with "Operation Iron Fist." While
initially successful, the operation ultimately resulted in a backlash by the LRA of increased
kidnappings and attacks.117 Efforts to negotiate a peace between the government and the LRA,
including several in 2003, were not honored by either side.118 The fighting in Uganda continues,
with both LRA fighters and government forces committing atrocities against civilians.119
In March 2004, after "significant international pressure" overcame the reluctance of
President Kabila, DRC referred itself to the ICC.120 A little over two months later, the Office of
the Prosecutor opened its first official investigation over the Congolese situation. One month
after that, the Court initiated its second investigation in Northern Uganda.122 In his referral ofthe
situation to the Court, President Museveni had asked that the Prosecutor only look into crimes
114 Refugee Law Project, Ambiguous Impacts: The Effects ofthe International Criminal Court Investigations in
Northern Uganda, Refugee Law Project Working PaperNo.22, Oct. 2012, available at
www.refugeelawproject.org/files/working_papers/RLP.WP22.pdf.
115 Amnesty International, supra note 113 at 16.
1.6 Id.
1.7 Briony MacPhee, Shannon Frank, and Katherine Scovner, The Current Investigation by the ICC ofthe Situation
inNorthern Uganda, The American Non-Governmental Organizations Commission for the International Criminal
Court(AMICC), Feb. 16,2006, available at http://amicc.org/docs/Northern%20Uganda%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
118 Id. at 2.
1,9 Id. at 3.
120 Kira Hild and Shannon Frank, supra note 102 at 7.
121 ICC, The Office ofthe Prosecutor ofthe International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation, Press
Release ICC-OTP-20040623-59, Jun. 23,2004.
122 ICC, Prosecutor ofthe International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda, Press
Release ICC-OTP-20040729-65, Jul. 29,2004.
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committed by the LRA, and not any committed by the government.123 While the Prosecutor must
conduct an impartial investigation that considers all parties in a situation124, Moreno-Ocampo
also had an interest in securing the cooperation of the state government. The announcement of
Uganda's self-referral was made in a joint press conference at which Moreno-Ocampo stood
side-by-side with Museveni.125 To date, the Court has issued arrest warrants for five individuals
in connection with crimes in Northern Uganda. All five are members of the LRA. Similarly,
the six persons indicted in connectionwith the situationin DRC are members of militiagroupsin
opposition to President Kabila.
These first investigations illustrate a problem inherent in the Court's reliance on self-
referral. For a number of reasons, self-referrals were not anticipated in the discussions leading up
to the Rome Statute.128 Referrals by state parties under Article 14 were expected to be done by
third party states. The drafters of the Statute assumed that a conflict of jurisdictions might ensue
wherein both the state government and the ICC would attempt to prosecute the same situation.
The self-referrals cultivated by the Prosecutor, however, created circumstances in which states
submitted situations to the ICC in lieu of prosecuting the crimes themselves. Additionally,
because the early cases of the Court all involved ongoing conflicts, there was a tendency towards
"asymmetric referrals" in which the state government sought to bring before the Court the
123 ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, Press
Release ICC-20040129-44, Jan. 29, 2004.
124 Rome Statute, Art. 54.
125 Press Release, supra note 122.
126 Ofthese, Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ogwen remain at large. The fifth, Raska
Lukwiya, waskilled in a battlewithUganda military forces on Aug. 12,2006.Therehavebeenreports thatVincent
Otti was killed in 2007, but these reports have not been substantiated by the ICC and his case remains open.
127 Two of themen, Callixte Mbarushimana and Sylvestre Mudacumura, areRwandan nationals.
128 Andreas Th.Mtiller and IgnazStegmiller, supra note 95 at 1269.
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actions of its opposition.129 This may have helped the Court count on cooperation with
enforcement from the state governments and further the narrative of a non-interventionist ICC.
However, it has made some civilians skeptical of the brand of justice the Court is offering.
Particularly in Uganda, the ICC appeared to be a tool that the government was using to fight the
LRA while covering over its own abuses.130 Generally, self-referrals may appear to stem from
the current government using the ICC to dispose ofits opposition.131
The third state to refer itself to the Court followed this unfortunate pattern. Ange-Felix
Patasse was elected president of the Central African Republic in 1993 and reelected in 1999.
Soon after his reelection, political rivals tried to oust Patasse from power.132 After the first
attempt at a coup in 2001, Patasse hired Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a wealthy warlord and the
former Vice President of DRC, to engage his military forces with the dissidents.133 Civilians
frequently became the targets of reprisals in clashes between the groups. A particular feature of
the CAR conflict has been the widespread use rape and sexual violence, far in excess of other
forms of torture or murder.134 In March 2003, while Patasse was at a conference in Niger, his
former Chief of Staff Francois Bozize seized control ofCAR and forced ^Patasse jinto exile.135
This seizure set off the CAR Bush War between Bozize's forces and several rebel groups. The
conflict led to more civilian attacks and large scale displacement of refugees into neighboring
129 Id. at 1270, citing B. Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: AChecklistfor National Implementation, 13
Nouvelles Etudes Penales 113,144(1999).
130 Refugee Law Project, supra note 114 at 9.
131 Antonio Cassese, Is theICC StillHaving Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 434, 436 (2006).
132 Jennifer Wheeler, Kyra Hild, and Gergana Halpern, The Current Investigation by the ICC ofthe Situation in The
Central African Republic, TheAmerican Non-Governmental Organizations Commission for the International
Criminal Court (AMICC), May28, 2008, available athttp://amicc.org/docs/Central%20African%20Republic.pdf.
133 Marlies Glasius, What is Global Justice andWho Decides? Civil Society and Victim Responses to the
International Criminal Court's FirstInvestigations, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 496, 500 (2009).
134 ICC, Background: Situation inthe Central African Republic, Press Release, ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220, May
22,2007.
135 Marlies Glasius, supra note 133 at 500.
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countries.136 This conflict eventually ended, but another against the Seleka rebel group ultimately
removed Bozize from power in2013.137 War in CAR continues to the present day.
In January 2005, while preparing for the election that would officially install him as
President, Bozize's government made a referral to the Prosecutor to investigate crimes
committed in CAR since the entry into force ofthe Court.138 The referral blamed the violence on
former president Patasse and his commander Bemba.139 When Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
opened the CAR investigation more than two years later140, he noted that he would monitor the
ongoing violence in the country, butdetermined that the "peak of violence and criminality" had
occurred in the months of 2002 and 2003.141 A year later in 2008, an arrest warrant was issued
for Jean-Pierre Bemba. Ange-Felix Patasse" returned from exile in 2009 to run for reelection. By
that point he had seemingly made up with rival Bozize, to whom he eventually lost in the
election.142 Patasse died of natural causes in April 2011. To date, no other arrests have been
made in connection with crimes committed in CAR, though in November 2013, Prosecutor
136 Jennifer Wheeler, KyraHild, and Gergana Halpern, supra note 132 at 5.
137 Associated Press, Central African Republic president flees as rebels enterBangui, The Guardian, Mar. 24,
2013, available atwww.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/24/central-african-republic-president-flees.
138 ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic, Press Release ICC-20050107-86, Jan.
7, 2005.
139 Jennifer Wheeler, Kyra Hild, and Gergana Halpern, supra note 132 at 2.
140 Atthetime of referral, an investigation was underway inCAR's Cour de Cassation. The Cour confirmed inApril
2006 that it wasnotequipped to handle crimes of thatmagnitude anddeferred to the ICC. In addition to thenational
proceedings, theProsecutor cited theinsecurity ofthe region and the financial burden ontheCourt of opening a
fourth investigation as reasons for the delay.
141 ICC, Prosecutor Opens Investigation inthe Central African Republic, Press Release ICC-20070522-220, May
22, 2007.
142 AFP, Backfrom exile, Central African ex-leader eyes election, AFP GLOBAL EDITION, Nov. 9,2009.available at
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Bensouda initiated a new case against Bemba and four others for offenses against the
administration ofjustice during Bemba's first trial.143
The Security Council Referrals
Where the first wave of cases may have been overly conciliatory with state governments,
the cases that followed shifted tactics and became directly antagonistic with them. The current
crisis in Darfur started in February 2003 when rebel movements started protesting the
government's Islamic policies and historic marginalization of the region.144 Darfur had once
been an independent region that was incorporated into Sudan under British rule. The
government, headed by longtime president Omar Al Bashir, conscribed counterinsurgents,
including a militia known as the Janjaweed, to fight the rebels. The militias began targeting
civilians, committing rape and torture, killing thousands and driving millions more from their
homes and across national borders.145 The United Nations took a number of steps to address the
situation, including establishing a Commission of Inquiry. The Commission found evidence of
war crimes and crimes against humanity, but stopped short of calling the crimes genocide. On
March 31, 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur
to the ICC.147 In the referral, the Security Council included the names of 51 suspects drawn up
143 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Kilolo, Mangenda, Babala, Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Bemba-Musamba-et-al-Eng.pdf. Narcisse Arido is a CentralAfricannational. The
other three men are, like Bemba, citizens of DRC.
144 Mariana Pena, Katherine Scovner, Gideon Copple, and Amitis Khojasteh, The Current Investigation ofthe ICC
of the Situation inDarfur, The American Non-Governmental Organizations Commission for the International
Criminal Court (AMICC), Aug. 2, 2007, available at www.amicc.org/docs/Darfur%20Investigation.pdf.
145 Mat 2.
,46/</.at3.
147 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005). The resolution was passed afteran abstention bytheUnited
States,which had advocate for a new ad hoc tribunal to be run jointly by the African Union and the UN. Sudan is
not a party to the Rome Statute.
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by the Commission.148 Most of the names were those of Janjaweed leaders and state officials.
The Court opened its investigation into Darfur less than three months later.149
At first, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo followed his usual pattern of deference, "look[ing]
forward" to receiving cooperation from the state government.150 He gave the impression that the
investigation would not be relying on the Commission's list of suspects.151 This approach was
criticized by human rights activists, who saw it as too similar to diplomatic entreaties to the
Sudanese government that had previously failed.152 Two years into the investigation, the attitude
changed. The diplomatic approach was not producing good results in any of the open
situations153 and the Sudanese government, particularly President Omar Al Bashir, was openly
uncooperative with the Court. With Sudan, however, the Court had the backing of the Security
Council and, presumably with it, its legal authority and enforcement powers. Moreno-Ocampo
announced the first warrants issued on the situation, against the alleged leader of the state-
supported Janjaweed and the Sudanese Minister for the Interior.154 Then, in 2008, the Prosecutor
stepped up his confrontational stance and requested that a warrant of arrest be issued for
President Al Bashir.155
148 Mariana Pena, Katherine Scovner, Gideon Copple, and Amitis Khojasteh, supra note 144 at 3.
149 ICC, The Prosecutor ofthe ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur, Press Release, ICC-OTP-0606-104, Jun. 6, 2005.
150 ICC, Security Council Refers Situation inDarfur toICC Prosecutor, Press Release, ICC-OTP-20050401-96, Apr.
1,2005.
151 Victor Peskin, supra note 53 at 667.
152 Id. at 657.
153 At the time, nine arrest warrantshad been issued across the DRCand Ugandasituationsand onlyone person,
Thomas Lubanga, had been taken into custody.
154 ICC, Prosecutor Opening Remarks, Press Release, ICC-OTP-20070227-208, Feb. 27,2007. The Prosecutor had
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The indictment of Al Bashir drew criticism from the African Union. In July of 2008, the
AU formally requested that the Security Council defer the investigation under Article 16 of the
Rome Statute.156 The primary criticism was that a peace process had been initiated between the
Sudanese government and the rebel militias, and that the ICC's involvement threatened to
destabilize those efforts for peace. Additionally, the communique suggested that the ICC
investigation would hinder the growth of domestic institutions that would encourage the rule of
law.157 Skeptics have questioned the good faith ofthe AU leaders.158 In a press conference that
year, the AU Chairman framed the issue as a choice between justice and peace; peace was the
AU's priority. Al Bashir stood next to him as he spoke.159 Adeferral from the Security Council
never came, and the Prosecutor remained steadfast. In July 2008, he attempted to have an
airplane carrying Ahmad Haroun diverted so that he could be arrested.160 Around the same time,
he refused domestic and international requests to withdraw the warrants issued against LRA
members in Uganda because of ongoing peace efforts there. Moreno-Ocampo asserted that, in
both situations, successful prosecutions would bring about peace.161 Four more warrants in the
Darfur situation were issued, against the leaders of three rebel militias and against the current
Sudanese Defense Minister.162 In 2009, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi became the
156 African Union Peace andSecurity Council Communique, PSC/Min/Comm (CLXII), Jul.21,2008.
157 Id. at 2.
158 Charles Chernor Jalloh, Africa andthe International Criminal Court: Collision Course orCooperation?, 34N.C.
Cen. L. Rev. 203,214 (2011-2012).
159 REUTERS, AUChairman Backs Sudan's Bashir Over Court, Sep. 8, 2008, available at
www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/08/idUSL8101824.
160 Victor Peskin, supra note 53 at 658. Theattempt was unsuccessful. Haroun remains at large.
161 Id. To date, none of the indicted persons in Uganda have been brought before the Court.
162 Proceedings against militia leader Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus were ended in2013 after reports that hehad
been killed. Charges against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda were dropped. The trial of Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain is
setto begin in May2014. Defense Minister Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein remains free.
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Chairman of the AU. In a General Assembly meeting that year, AU member states were
instructed not to enforce the warrant against Bashir nor to assist the ICC in its investigation.
In 2011, the Security Council referred its second case to the ICC: Libya. The situation in
Libya is distinguished by its rapid development. In February, in the midst of the Arab Spring,
protestors gathered outside the city of Benghazi in opposition to Gaddafi's long totalitarian rule.
Gaddafi moved quickly in response, hiring foreign militias to violently crack down on
protests.164 On February 25, Gaddafi ordered his security forces to initiate air raids against the
largely unarmed protestors.165 The next day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970
referring the situation to the ICC.166 The investigation was opened by the Court five days later.167
In June, three warrants were issued: for Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and head of
Libyan Intelligence Abdullah Al-Senussi.168 The referral was a political move by the Security
Council which hoped to end the conflict and remove Gaddafi from power.169 The move,
however, was in stark contrast to how the Security Council had dealt with the contemporaneous
struggle going on in Syria. At the time of the Libya referral, protests against Syria's president
Bashar al-Assad had been going on for 11 months. The violent government reprisals had left
163 Decisions andDeclarations, Assembly/AU/Dec. 243-267 (XIII), Jul. 3,2009. Gaddafi hadbeen a longtime
advocate for "African unity"
164 Anna F.Triponel and Paul R. Williams, The Clash ofthe Titans: Justice andRealpolitik in Libya, 28AM. U.
Int'l L. Rev. 775,799 (2013).
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more than ten thousand dead.170 The difference seemingly lay in Syria's alliance with Russia.
Russia and China, both permanent members of the Security Council, opposedusing the Court in
Syria but were neutral and accepting of its employment in Libya.
The discrepancy in the handling of Libya and Syria has led to a push to depoliticize
referrals to the Court.171 At the end of 2011, the Assembly of State Parties proposed to adopt a
set of transparent and consistent criteria that would establish when a situation should be
referred.172 At the same time, Libya's transitional government announced that it would refuse to
171hand over Saif Gaddafi because the government intended to have him tried in a national court.
Some powerful international actors, like the United Kingdom, have voiced their support for this
option.174 In early 2012, Libya asked that the Court postpone its request for the surrender ofSaif
Gaddafi. The Court refused.175 Soon after the Court proposed a compromise in which Gaddafi
could be tried within Libya, but under the supervision of the ICC.176 The Libyan government
responded with a challenge to the admissibility of the case, declaring that the state was neither
170 Id. at 802.
171 Id. at 804.
172 Assembly of State Parties, Retreat onthe Future ofthe International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/10/INF.3, Dec. 1,
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unwilling nor unable to carry out a prosecution and thus the ICC had no jurisdiction. The
17ftLibyan governmentcontinues to fight with the Courtover who should try the accused.
The Proprio Motu Cases
To date, the Prosecutor's power to initiate investigations proprio motu has been exercised
twice. The second instance, the situation in Cote dTvoire, follows a pattern similar to the Court's
early self-referred cases. In early 2003 Cote dTvoire, not a state party to the Court, made a
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court concerning events in the country that had
happened since September 19, 2002.179 On that day, mutinying national soldiers and rebels from
the Patriotic Movement of Cote dTvoire attempted to overthrow the government of President
Laurent Gbagbo.180 The rebels took over the north of the country, killing many including the
Minister of the Interior and former President Robert Gue'i. President Gbagbo, who had been out
of the country, returned and engaged the national military and hired militias against the rebels.
Both sides of the conflict carried out atrocities against civilians.181 Human Rights Watch
published a report detailing murder, including summary executions, sexual assault, and the use of
177 Prosecutor v. SaifAl-Islam Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on"Government of Libya's Appeal
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child soldiers. In the report, they called upon the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the
situation in Cote dTvoire.182
No investigation was initiated at this time. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo was at that time
still cultivating a culture of self-referral. As a non-state party, Cote dTvoire could not choosethe
preferred channel ofreferring itself.183 Aproprio motu investigation was initiated, however, after
a renewal of violence following the elections of November 28, 2010. In the presidential election,
Laurent Gbagbo lost to longtime rival and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo
refused to concede the election and declared himself the winner. Fearing reprisals, thousands of
Ouattara's supporters fled into neighboring countries.184 In the months that followed, Gbagbo
"launched a reign of terror" on theopposition, sending outmilitary squads who murdered, raped,
and tortured civilians.185 Alassane Ouattara, recognized by the international community as the
legitimate president, renewed his country's acceptance of jurisdiction in a letter to the Court.
The Prosecutor announced his intention to open an investigation, which was approved by Pre-
Trial Chambers in February 2012.187 Though the Prosecutor had initially only sought to include
crimes since the 2010 election in the investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber expanded the scopeto
include all crimes since the authorization ofjurisdiction in 2002. Three warrants have so far been
182 Human Rights Watch, Country on a Precipice: The Precarious State ofHuman Rights and Civilian Protection in
Cote d'lvoire, May 4, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/cdi0505.
183 Andreas Th. Muller and Ignaz Stegmiller, supra note 95at 1285. Cote d'lvoirebecame a party to theRome
Statute on May 1,2013.
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issued, all dealing with post-2010 events, for Laurent Gbagbo, his wife Simone Gbagbo, and
Ivorian army recruiter Charles Ble Goude.188
The Prosecutor's first proprio motu investigation is arguably the Court's most
contentious. Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may receive communications concerning
crimes within the Court's jurisdiction and make determinations on whether or not to open an
official investigation.189 These preliminary examinations determine whether there is jurisdiction
and admissibility to proceed. The Court has opened 11 preliminary examinations that have not
led to the opening of an official investigation. Three of the preliminaries have been closed. The
situation in Iraq, alleging war crimes committed by soldiers from the United States and United
Kingdom, was closed for lack ofjurisdiction over the parties.190 The case ofPalestine was closed
because, despite having received a declaration from the Palestinian National Authority accepting
the jurisdiction of the Court, Palestine is not considered a "state" as understood by the Rome
Statute.191 Venezuela, which is a party to the Rome Statute, was deemed not to have experienced
crimesof sufficient gravity to fall within the jurisdictionof the Court.
Of the preliminary examinations that remain open, four are being assessed for subject
matter jurisdiction and four for admissibility.193 The examination ofColombia has been ongoing
since 2005. Significant evidence shows that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been
188 Simone Gbagbo is the first andonly woman to be indicted bythe ICC.
189 Rome Statute, Art. 15.
190 ICC, Preliminary Examinations: Completed-Decision not to proceed, available athttp://icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/stmcture%20ofyo20me%20court/office%20ofyo20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe^
cdnp/Pages/default.aspx. Iraq is not a party to the Rome Statute.
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committed in the ongoing conflict between government forces and rebel militias. The case
remains in limbo as the Office of the Prosecutor monitors continuing national proceedings,
assessing whether they are genuine and whether the accused are being tried for crimes of
sufficient gravity.194 The situation in Georgia, initiated in 2008, has generated nearly four
thousand communications to the Prosecutor regarding the forced relocation, murder, and torture
of thousands of civilians in the conflict in South Ossetia. "According to the information available
at this stage," national investigations are proceeding in both Georgia and Russia. The Prosecutor
has requested to receive updates on the status ofthese investigations.195 Two African countries
are also under examination. The case in Guinea revolves around the massacre that occurred at
Conakry Stadium on September 28, 2009 in which 150 people were killed and many others
assaulted. Anational investigation has been ongoing since February 2010.196 The case in Nigeria
was initiated in November 2010 and concerns crimes allegedly committed by the Boko Haram
jihadist group. The government of Nigeria has presented "a significant body of information" on
• 197its ongoing national investigation, which the Court continues to monitor.
Kenya came to the Court'sattention in 2008, when violent protests took place throughout
the country after the presidential reelection of Mwai Kibaki in December of the previous year.
Kibaki's opponent Raila Odinga alleged that the election was fraudulent and supporters of the
two candidates clashed over political and ethnic grievances. Violence continued in the country
for three months, at which pointa peace deal was brokered between the two rivals. By then, over
194 Id. at 31.
195 Id. at 40.
196 Id. at44. According to thereport, thegovernment ofGuinea istrying thesame suspects forthesame crimes as
wouldthe ICC. The Prosecutor is still monitoring the situation to determine if the government is "unwillingor
unable" to carry out the prosecutions.
197 Id. at 50.
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thirteen hundred people had been killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced. The Kenya
National Commission of Human Rights investigated the violence and determined that it hadbeen
carried out with deliberation and had been instigated by political leaders.199 A Commission of
Inquiry on Post-Election Violence recommended the establishment of a special tribunal to
investigate the crimes.200 The Kenyan government agreed to refer the situation to the ICC if a
national process could not be initiated.201 Efforts to establish a special tribunal could not come
together202 and the ICC officially opened its investigation into Kenya on March 31, 2010.203 The
Kenyan government was initially supportive of the investigation, but things changed when the
Court announced its list of suspects that included mostly government officials.204 In March of
2011, the Court issued summons for six of them, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta, to appear and answer to charges of crimes against humanity.
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Kenya quickly filed an application challenging the Court's jurisdiction, citing their own ongoing
.• .- 206investigation.
Things were complicated further when Kenyatta ran for the presidency in March 2013
and, with William Ruto as his running mate, won.207 Supporters claimed his victory was in
protest to the "Western powers" controlling the ICC. Others criticized the Court for not going
after Kibaki and Odinga.208 With two African leaders now facing trials before the ICC, the
African Union began to openly oppose the Court. At a summit to discuss the Court in October
2013, AU leaders unanimously agreed that heads of state should be immune from prosecution.
Officials discussed the possibility of calling for a mass withdrawal of African states from the
ICC, though so far no such action has been taken.210 Meanwhile, the ongoing trials have suffered
from a lack cooperation from the Kenyan government and the alleged bribery and intimidation of
witnesses.211 The start of Kenyatta's trial has been moved back twice to allow the Office of the
Prosecutor time to collect more evidence. It is currently scheduled to begin on October 7,
2014.212
The Future and Alternatives
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The controversy over the Kenyan trials underscores the role that international perception
of the Court plays in its functioning. The image of the ICC as a Western court focused on Africa
gives ammunition to the powerful leaders it seeks to try. Combatting this image is critical for the
outcome of these cases and the Court's future in general. One thing that may help change the
perception is the appointment of an African Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, who took office
on June 15, 2012. Bensouda has denied that the Court is targeting African leaders by famously
pointing out that "all the victims are African victims."213 It is unclear at this time whether
Bensouda's tenure will bring about a change in the direction of prosecutions since most of her
work to date has involved the situations inherited from her predecessor.214 There is no strong
evidence that Bensouda, who was Deputy Prosecutor under Moreno-Ocampo for eightyears, will
shift the focus of the Court away from Africa.
The current crisis in Mali started in January 2012 following the civil war in neighboring
Libya. Tuareg nationalists launched a campaign against the government for the independence of
the Azawad region in northern Mali. In March, the rebels ousted President Amadou Toumani
Toure and suspended the Constitution. Members of the international community, including the
United Nations and the African Union, condemned the coup.215 The offensive continued as
rebels took several major northern cities. On June 13, 2012, the Malian government referred the
situation to the ICC, detailing alleged abuses by rebel fighters including summary executions,
massacres, rape, and torture.216 In October, the Security Council organized an international
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military coalition to aid Malian government forces.217 In January 2013, the French government
deployed troops to the country not, it said, to aid the government but to fight global terrorism.
Days later, ProsecutorBensouda initiated her first investigation into the situationin Mali.
Another possibility for change may come from the Security Council. Human rights
activists have pushed for the Council to refer the situation in Syria to the Court.220 In February of
2014 a United Nations Human Rights Commission called for the Security Council to refer the
situation in North Korea, stating that the crimes that have been committed there do not "have any
parallel inthe contemporary world."221 To do this, however, the Security Council would need to
sway the allies of those countries, particularly Russia and China. Referrals from the Security
Council are a double-edged sword. On one hand, they carry with them the authority of the UN
and have the ability to act on states that are otherwise not parties to the Rome Statute. On the
other hand, the Security Council is a political body that does not have a strong mandate for
impartiality as the Court does.
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Despite assertions to the contrary, the International Criminal Court has focused its
attention on African states from the beginning. Each category of cases presents a unique
problem. For situations that are self-referred, the Court forges a relationship with the state that
hinders impartial investigation in order to engender cooperation. The Court must conciliate state
governments or risk being cut off from evidence and witnesses. Additionally, the reliance on the
Court by these states precludes the possibility of developing national or regional institutions that
could handle such cases on their own. The ICC has more resources and support than any state
court system or the African Union's proposed Court of Justice and Human Rights. Accordingly,
the ICC is and will continue to be a forum of first resort for many African states. While it may
not be the intention of the Court, Africa's reliance on external forces continues the culture of
continental dependence that was created by colonialism. For situations referred by the Security
Council, the Court must deal with the sort of political dealings the Rome Statute tried to
eliminate. States with powerful allies are shielded from the Court's jurisdiction, and African
states are typically without powerful allies. This is not, as some African leaders would have it,
unfair to Africa. The Court's jurisdiction covers the worst possible crimes and the inability to
bring justice to some countries does not mean it should be denied to others. It is, however,
unequal. The perception that other parts of the world can "get away" with committing such
crimes reinforces Africa's position as inferior. It is also directly contrary to the Court's mission
to end impunity. Proprio motu investigations are also not without political consideration. What
constitutes "unwillingness" on the part of a state's judiciary is subjectively determined by the
Prosecutor. The internal judicial processes of some states receive more deference than others.
The Court should not abandon Africa or stop pursuing justice in African cases. The Court
should, however, make the reach of its justice global by pursuing cases outside Africa as well.
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Doing this will help the continent be apartner in global justice rather than atarget. It will also
help the Court maintain the good will and support it needs to carry out its mission to end
impunity.
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